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THE FLORIDA “THREE STRIKES RULE” FOR MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE CLAIMS: USING A CLEAR AND CONVINCING 
EVIDENCE STANDARD TO TIGHTEN THE STRIKE ZONE FOR 
PHYSICIAN LICENSURE REVOCATION 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In a speech made to the Senate Judiciary Committee, Chief Justice John 
Roberts stated, “Judges are like umpires.  Umpires don’t make the rules; they 
apply them.”1  This comparison of the judiciary to America’s favorite pastime 
sparked discussion amongst commentators, one of whom remarked that the 
analogy was a “rhetorically-appealing comment, no doubt, but not entirely 
accurate in practice.”2  Michael McCann, a writer for the Sports Law Blog, 
used the strike zone of umpire Angel Hernandez to illustrate this purported 
inaccuracy of Roberts’ statement.3  McCann noted how Hernandez uses a 
“uniquely-wide strike zone” and questioned whether this modified strike zone 
is merely an interpretation of the standard Major League Baseball Zone, or 
whether it is so distinct that it should be viewed as Hernandez “replacing the 
standard rule with his own rule.”4  Although McCann’s example is most 
analogous to judicial interpretation, it inadvertently touches on another parallel 
between umpiring and judicial review: the importance of uniform standards. 
In baseball, an umpire may be criticized for calling strikes outside of the 
standard Major League Baseball strike zone because it is the standard used by 
every team.5  As McCann illustrates in his Angel Hernandez example, a fan 
determines that an umpire’s call is unfair when it deviates from a common 
standard every umpire is expected to know and uphold.  Fairness, however, 
becomes more complicated when multiple standards exist for the same rule.  
What if Major League Baseball created two distinct standards for the strike 
zone or permitted each team to determine the strike zone used for its own 
 
 1. Charles Babington & Jo Becker, ‘Judges are Not Politicians,’ Roberts Says, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 13, 2005, at A1 (quoting Chief Justice John Roberts’ statements to the Senate 
Judiciary Committee in 2005). 
 2. Posting of Michael McCann to Sports Law Blog, http://sports-law.blogspot.com/2005/ 
09/evaluating-judge-john-roberts-analogy.html (Sept. 14, 2005 06:25 EST). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Major League Baseball Official Baseball Rules § 2.00, available at http://mlb.mlb.com/ 
mlb/downloads/y2007/02_definitions_of_terms.pdf. 
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playing field?  In that case, an umpire, like a judge, could only determine 
whether a ball fell within a team’s designated strike zone.  Umpires do not 
make the standards; they simply apply them. 
Unlike Major League Baseball, the “strike zone,” or evidentiary standard 
used by state medical boards in physician licensure proceedings, varies from 
state to state.6  When a board revokes a physician’s medical license, it is 
compelled by state law to apply either a “preponderance” standard or a “clear 
and convincing” evidence standard, which creates a double-edged sword of 
competing policy interests.7  As a result of the administrative nature of state 
medical boards, state judges give board decisions highly deferential treatment 
if a physician appeals.8  Judges, like umpires, usually determine whether the 
designated evidentiary standard was properly applied and will not question the 
fairness of the standard unless the parties bring the issue before them.9  In 
recent years, however, more and more state judges have critiqued the 
constitutional soundness and policy arguments behind state medical board 
evidentiary standards.10 
Currently, the majority of states use a preponderance standard because 
legislators and judges believe it provides the public greater protection against 
incompetent physicians.11  Alternatively, advocates in the minority of states 
that uphold a clear and convincing evidence standard claim that application of 
a preponderance standard deprives physicians of their constitutional due 
process rights.  Both factions raise legitimate concerns, yet neither has 
 
 6. Roy G. Spece Jr. & John J. Marchalonis, Sound Constitutional Analysis, Moral 
Principle, and Wise Policy Judgment Require a Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard of 
Proof in Physician Disciplinary Proceedings, 3 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 107, 108–09 (2006). 
 7. Id. at 108–09. 
 8. In re License Issued to Zahl, 895 A.2d 437, 445 (N.J. 2006) (“Our appellate review of an 
agency’s choice of sanction is limited.  Courts generally afford substantial deference to the 
actions of administrative agencies such as the Board. . . .  Deference is appropriate because of the 
‘expertise and superior knowledge’ of agencies in their specialized fields . . . .” (citing Matturi v. 
Bd. of Trs. of the Judicial Ret. Sys., 802 A.2d 496, 504 (N.J. 2002))). 
 9. See, e.g., N.D. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs—Investigative Panel B v. Hsu, 726 N.W.2d 
216, 226 (N.D. 2007) (“It is well established that courts exercise a limited review in appeals from 
decisions by administrative agencies, including the Board.”). 
 10. See, e.g., In re Setliff, 645 N.W.2d 601, 608 (S.D. 2002) (holding that due process 
requires a clear and convincing evidence standard in state medical board proceedings). But see 
Hsu, 726 N.W.2d 216 (holding that state medical boards may use a preponderance of the 
evidence standard without violating constitutional due process requirements). 
 11. Spece & Marchalonis, supra note 6, at 108 (stating “approximately three-quarters of our 
states . . . employ the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof in disciplinary 
proceedings”); Tara K. Widmer, South Dakota Should Follow Public Policy and Switch to the 
Preponderance Standard for Medical License Revocation After In re The Medical License of Dr. 
Reuben Setliff, M.D., 48 S.D. L. REV. 388, 405–06 (2003) (commenting about the public interest 
concerns by states that employ a preponderance standard). 
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attempted to create a uniform standard that equally protects the interests of 
both patients and physicians. 
Unfortunately, medical boards are not sufficiently protecting patients from 
malpractice under either evidentiary standard, which exacerbates the problem.  
Studies reveal that today’s national “malpractice crisis” is the result of 
inadequate patient safety rather than an influx of frivolous claims and that 
medical malpractice payments are not only rational, but often a sound indicator 
of unqualified physicians.12  A 2007 Public Citizen report showed that 
approximately six percent of doctors are responsible for almost sixty percent of 
all malpractice payments, yet most of these doctors are not disciplined at all by 
their respective medical boards.13  The victims of malpractice and their 
families are responsible for most of the complaints brought before state 
medical boards, but as few as one and a half percent of these complaints ever 
reach the hearing stage before the board.14  Regarding the ratio of medical 
malpractice payments to discipline, physicians are only one-third as likely “to 
be convicted of professional misconduct reportable to the National Practitioner 
Data Bank as they are to have to make a reportable medical malpractice 
payment.”15  This proves to be a universal problem among states, regardless of 
the evidentiary standard applied by the board.16  Neither regime has met the 
incompetence dilemma with much success.  Although a preponderance 
standard would theoretically result in a greater rate of discipline, the 
improvement would be negligible due to the lack of prosecution among state 
medical boards.17  The crux of the problem does not stem from the minority of 
 
 12. PUB. CITIZEN’S CONG. WATCH, THE GREAT MEDICAL MALPRACTICE HOAX: NPDB 
DATA CONTINUE TO SHOW MEDICAL LIABILITY SYSTEM PRODUCES RATIONAL OUTCOMES 10–
12 (2007), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/NPDB%20Report_Final.pdf.  In 2005, 
64% of malpractice payments involved death, severe or major permanent injury, paralysis, brain 
damage or necessitated lifelong care.  Id. at 7.  In contrast, only 32% involved less severe injuries, 
disproving the myth that the medical liability system compensates undeserving patients.  Id.  
Similarly, 82% of the total values paid out from malpractice claims went to patients who suffered 
significant injuries or death.  Id. at 7–8. 
 13. Id. at 12–13.  The study describes several “repeat offenders” of medical malpractice who 
were not disciplined by the state medical board at all.  Id. 
 14. RANDALL R. BOVBJERG & PABLO ALIAGA, STATE DISCIPLINE OF PHYSICIANS: 
ASSESSING STATE MEDICAL BOARDS THROUGH CASE STUDIES vi (2006), available at 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/2006/stdiscp/pdf (“Some 60–90% of complaints came from the 
public in the study states, almost entirely from patients and families.”). 
 15. Spece & Marchalonis, supra note 6, at 109. 
 16. See, e.g., BOVBJERG & ALIAGA, supra note 14.  The study compiled data from six 
different state medical boards.  Id. at 6.  The states used for the study were California, Virginia 
and Washington, which use a clear and convincing evidence standard, and Iowa, Massachussetts 
and Ohio, which use a preponderance standard.  Id. 
 17. Id. at 51 (“One executive director suggested that a Board’s ‘biggest challenge’ is to 
measure its ‘quality of decision-making,’ for example, in triaging complaints and deciding on 
prosecutions and sanctions, a sentiment echoed by another state’s executive director.”). 
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cases that slip through the cracks due to less stringent evidentiary standards, 
but rather from the remaining ninety-eight percent of cases that never even 
make it to a formal disciplinary hearing. 
In light of these concerns, one state has taken an unprecedented step 
toward solving the dilemma of undisciplined repeat malpractice offenders.  On 
November 2, 2004, Florida passed “Amendment 8,” now known as the “Three 
Strikes Rule” for medical malpractice.18  According to the amendment, any 
physician found liable for three medical malpractice actions will no longer be 
permitted to practice medicine in the state.19  The legislature, however, 
subsequently added a caveat to the rule: the findings of repeated medical 
malpractice must be based “upon clear and convincing evidence.”20  If a doctor 
was found to have committed medical malpractice by a preponderance of the 
evidence, the board must examine the record of the case and determine 
whether the findings would have been supported by clear and convincing 
evidence.21  Otherwise, the incident will not count as a “strike” against the 
doctor’s license.22  By tightening the strike zone for physician discipline with a 
clear and convincing evidence standard, the Three Strikes Rule provides 
safeguards against undeserved license revocations while making a bold step 
toward protecting the public from incompetent physicians.  Although the 
scheme is controversial on its face, it offers an innovative solution to the 
medical malpractice dilemma that equally addresses the concerns of physicians 
and patients.  This three strikes regime potentially balances competing 
concerns more efficiently than medical boards that currently operate under a 
preponderance standard or a clear and convincing evidence standard alone. 
This paper will first provide an overview of physician disciplinary 
proceedings.  Second, it will give a summary of the case law supporting both 
the preponderance standard and the clear and convincing evidence standard.  
Third, it will review the statutory scheme provided by the Florida legislature in 
enacting the Three Strikes Rule and its subsequent provisions.  Fourth, it will 
analyze the statute’s resolution of adverse policy arguments and its potential 
effects on traditional physician disciplinary schemes.  Finally, it will advocate 
uniform application of a three strikes regime that utilizes a clear and 
convincing evidence standard. 
 
 18. Melissa Morgan Hawkins, Amendments 7 and 8 Update: Legislation Enabling the 
Patients’ Right to Know Act and Three Strikes Rule, 25 TRIAL ADVOC. Q., Spring 2006, at 7. 
 19. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 26. 
 20. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 456.50(2) (2007). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id.  See also Hawkins, supra note 18, at 10. 
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II.  A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF STATE MEDICAL BOARD DISCIPLINARY 
PROCEEDINGS 
In general, the purpose of physician licensure is to protect the public from 
those who are unqualified to practice medicine.23  If a physician is suspected of 
misconduct, disciplinary action against the physician usually begins with the 
state medical board, which attempts to ensure that health care providers 
conform to “sound professional standards of conduct.”24  State medical boards 
derive their powers and procedures from state statutes, and boards may 
exercise only those powers that are expressly conferred or implied by statute.25  
The state statutes also include the evidentiary standard the state medical board 
applies when conducting disciplinary proceedings. Generally, state legislatures 
delegate power to hear and determine the charges for physicians to the state 
board, which also has discretion in determining the punishment for the 
physician.26  Statutes usually grant boards the power to impose any of the 
following disciplinary actions: fine, reprimand, censure, probation, limit, 
condition, suspension or revocation.27  Although these administrative hearings 
were once fairly informal, “today such adjudicative hearings more closely 
resemble a non-jury trial in a civil court.”28  The process must comport with 
due process, but the board is given much discretion in the investigation, 
adjudication and appeals processes.29 
The disciplinary process usually begins with the intake of complaints.30  
Patients or family members of patients bring the majority of these complaints, 
but public agencies and hospitals can also file complaints.31 Most state boards 
 
 23. Mary Feighny & Camille Nohe, A Species Unto Themselves: Professional Disciplinary 
Actions, 71 J. KAN. BAR ASSN. 29, 29–30 (2002) (The purpose of a professional licensing act is 
to protect the public “against unprofessional, improper, unauthorized and unqualified practice of 
the healing arts.  The goal is to secure to the people the services of competent, trustworthy 
practitioners.  The act seeks to do this through licensure.  The licensing by the state, granted only 
after minimal standards of proficiency are met, amounts to the state’s recognition of the licentiate 
as a qualified practitioner.  The continued holding of the license may be taken by the public as 
official indication those standards are being maintained.  The object of both granting and 
revoking a license is the same—to exclude the incompetent or unscrupulous from practicing the 
healing arts.” (quoting Kan. State Bd. of Healing Arts v. Foote, 436 P.2d 828, 833 (Kan. 1968))). 
 24. 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, Etc. § 89 (2007). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Feighny & Nohe, supra note 23, at 37. 
 28. BOVBJERG & ALIAGA, supra note 14, at 27. 
 29. 61 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 24, § 92 (2007). 
 30. BOVBJERG & ALIAGA, supra note 14, at 20–21 (“Most states call all disciplinary cases 
‘complaints’ even when there is no complainant.”). 
 31. Id. at 21 (finding that in some states, as many as 90% of the complaints are brought by 
the public through patients and family members; however, a small contingent of complaints are 
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require complainants to submit a formal complaint on a written or online form 
or by telephone before beginning an investigation.32  Once a physician is 
suspected of improper actions, the board will first conduct an investigation to 
determine whether there is sufficient evidence to warrant a disciplinary 
proceeding.33  During the investigation stage, the board is not required to 
disclose to the physician either the nature of the charges against him or the 
identity of his accuser.  Due process simply requires providing the physician 
with notice of the probable cause hearing and allowing the presence of counsel 
at the hearing.34  If the investigator finds sufficient evidence, most boards 
appoint an attorney to serve as a “prosecutor” in the disciplinary proceeding.35 
The hearing itself resembles formal adjudication in that both parties are 
permitted to present evidence, cross-examine witnesses and argue the case; 
however, the hearings are typically more relaxed than formal adjudications 
with regard to evidentiary rules.36  Presiding officers in state medical board 
proceedings are not bound by formal rules of evidence, so several forms of 
evidence that are normally excluded in formal adjudications may be 
considered.37 
Similar to a formal adjudication, the board must support its decision to 
discipline a physician with sufficient evidence.  Sufficiency of the evidence 
depends greatly on the evidentiary standard applied.  The essential function of 
this evidentiary standard is to “‘instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of 
confidence our society thinks [the factfinder] should have in the correctness of 
 
also brought by health personnel, board staff, hospital peer review, malpractice claims 
notifications and police or drug enforcement officials). 
 32. Id.  Ohio is one of the few states that allow complainants to submit complaints 
anonymously.  Most states require the complainants to submit their names in order to ease 
investigation and prosecution.  Id. 
 33. Feighny & Nohe, supra note 23, at 37. 
 34. Id. at 35. 
 35. Id. at 37. 
 36. Id. at 42. 
 37. Id. Feighny and Nohe explain the differences in evidentiary rules between board 
hearings and formal trials: 
[T]estimony is not necessarily excluded simply because the evidence is hearsay.  
Nonparties may be allowed the opportunity to present oral or written statements provided 
the parties are able to challenge or rebut any such statements, including requesting that the 
statement be given under oath.  Document copies may be readily available.  Official 
notice may be taken of the agency’s record of other proceedings, technical or scientific 
matters within the agency’s specialized knowledge, certain standards adopted by state or 
federal agencies or nationally recognized organizations, and any matter than can be 
judicially noticed in court provided the parties are notified and afforded the opportunity to 
contest the ruling.   
Id. 
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factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.’”38 The preponderance 
standard, which is most often used in civil cases, means simply that it is more 
likely than not that the physician committed the alleged malpractice or 
egregious act.  As in civil cases, if the evidence is perfectly balanced on both 
sides, the board cannot find the physician accountable in accordance with the 
preponderance standard.  The clear and convincing evidence standard, in 
contrast, more closely resembles the standard in criminal adjudications.  This 
standard is not as difficult to meet as the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard 
in criminal trials.  However, it clearly requires a greater amount of evidence 
than the preponderance standard. Although the majority of states apply a 
preponderance standard in state medical board disciplinary proceedings, nearly 
one-quarter of states apply a clear and convincing evidence standard.39 
If a board decides to sanction a physician, the decision is subject to judicial 
review.40  Unlike most civil adjudications, “the ‘standard of judicial review of 
board decisions is extremely deferential: courts will generally only overturn 
board decisions that are unsupported by substantial evidence in the record.’”41  
Among the limited circumstances that warrant a reversal, a state court may 
reverse the decision of a board if the order violates the physician’s 
constitutional rights.  Usually, as long as the record contains adequate findings 
of fact sufficient to support license revocation and the court sees no 
constitutional concerns, the court will affirm the board’s decision.42  This 
 
 38. N.D. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs—Investigative Panel B v. Hsu, 726 N.W.2d 216, 227 
(N.D. 2007) (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979)). 
 39. Spece & Marchalonis, supra note 6, at 110–11. 
 40. Widmer, supra note 11, at 396. 
 41. Id. (quoting Timothy P. McCormick, Comment, Expert Testimony and Professional 
Licensing Boards: What Is Good, What Is Necessary, and the Myth of the Majority-Minority 
Split, 53 ME. L. REV. 139, 144 (2001)). 
 42. 61 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 24, at § 102.  See also Hsu, 736 N.W.2d at 226.  According 
to North Dakota law under N.D. CENT. CODE § 28–32–46, a board decision must be affirmed by 
a court unless: 
1. The order is not in accordance with the law. 
2. The order is in violation of the constitutional rights of the appellant. 
3. The provisions of this chapter have not been complied with in the proceedings before 
the agency. 
4. The rules or procedure of the agency have not afforded the appellant a fair hearing. 
5. The findings of fact made by the agency are not supported by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
6. The conclusions of law and order of the agency are not supported by findings of fact. 
7. The findings of fact made by the agency do not sufficiently address the evidence 
presented to the agency by the appellant. 
8. The conclusions of law and order of the agency do not sufficiently explain the agency’s 
rationale for not adopting any contrary recommendations by a hearing officer or an 
administrative law judge. 
Id. at 226. 
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adequacy will naturally vary depending on the evidentiary standard applied by 
the board; a lower standard will necessitate less evidence in upholding 
disciplinary decisions. 
III.  BALANCING COMPETING INTERESTS: A SCHISM AMONG STATE COURTS 
When administrative proceedings depart from the standard procedural 
safeguards provided in formal adjudications, constitutional due process 
concerns may arise.  The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”43  Similarly, the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that the states may not 
“deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.”44  
Despite the Fifth Amendment’s linguistic simplicity, due process 
determinations in administrative proceedings are more complex than due 
process determinations in formal court adjudications.  State medical board 
proceedings differ from formal adjudications in several ways, but these 
differences do not necessarily create a violation of due process.45  Unlike 
medical malpractice actions, which usually entail compensating the personal 
harm suffered by a particular plaintiff or class, physician licensure revocation 
entails protecting the interests of the public at large.  As a result, due process 
analysis entails a complicated balancing act between individual liberties and 
the interests of the public.46 
It is worthy to note that appeals from professional disciplinary actions may 
be brought in federal court when the complainant alleges violation of 
constitutional due process.47  It appears, however, that the majority of due 
process challenges to state medical board determinations are brought in state 
court; therefore, the background of this section will place emphasis on state 
court jurisprudence regarding state medical board due process challenges.48 
 
 43. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 44. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. 
 45. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 
254, 266–67 (1970). 
 46. See, e.g., Hsu, 726 N.W.2d at 227; Nguyen v. State, Dept. of Med. Quality Assurance 
Comm’n, 29 P.3d 689, 693 (Wash. 2001) (en banc). 
 47. See, e.g., Romero-Barcelo v. Acevedo-Vila, 275 F. Supp. 2d 177, 189–90 (D. P. R. 
2003) (involving an attorney who appealed disciplinary actions from an attorney disciplinary 
proceeding, claiming that he was deprived of constitutional due process rights). 
 48. This author has failed to find any court cases brought in federal court by physicians 
challenging state medical board determinations on the basis of constitutional due process.  The 
following cases involving state board determinations were brought exclusively in state court. 
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A. The Three-Prong Test for Due Process Under Matthews v. Eldridge 
Mathews v. Eldridge serves as the landmark case in challenging 
administrative procedures on the basis of constitutional due process 
objections.49  Under Mathews, a court must apply a three-prong test to 
determine whether or not the agency action violates the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment.50  This test has been instrumental to courts in the 
context of the evidentiary standards dilemma for state medical boards.51 
In Mathews, the respondent, Eldridge, collected cash benefits under the 
disability insurance benefits program of the Social Security Act, which 
provides workers with funds during times when they are completely disabled.52  
Eldridge collected his first payment in June 1968 and then received a 
questionnaire in 1972 from the state agency that monitored his medical 
condition.53  On the questionnaire, Eldridge indicated that his medical 
condition had not improved and provided the administration with contact 
information for his treating physicians.54  The state agency, after receiving the 
questionnaire and medical records from Eldridge’s physician and psychiatric 
consultant, made a tentative determination that he was no longer eligible for 
disability benefits after May 1972.55  The agency informed Eldridge that he 
could request reasonable time in which to obtain additional information to 
dispute the agency decision.56  In a letter, Eldridge responded that the agency 
had enough evidence to establish that he had a disability, but the agency still 
revoked his status as a disabled person in May 1972; the determination was 
accepted by the Social Security Administration shortly thereafter.57  The Social 
Security Administration informed Eldridge that he would have the right to state 
agency reconsideration in six months.58 
Following the determination, Eldridge sued in the Western District Court 
of Virginia, claiming that the state agency violated his constitutional due 
process right when it revoked his benefits without an oral evidentiary hearing, 
 
 49. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 50. Id. at 334–35. 
 51. See, e.g., Eaves v. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 467 N.W.2d 234, 237 (Iowa 1991); Rucker v. 
Mich. Bd. of Med., 360 N.W.2d 154, 155 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); Petition of Grimm, 635 A.2d 
456, 461 (N.H. 1993); In re Polk License Revocation, 449 A.2d 7, 13 (N.J. 1982); Gandhi v. 
Med. Examining Bd., 483 N.W.2d 295, 298 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1992).  The Mathews framework has 
translated into the context of most medical licensure revocation cases, even though the framework 
originated in the context of a disability benefits determination under the Social Security Act. 
 52. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 323 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 323–24. 
 55. Id. at 324. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 324. 
 58. Id. 
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which welfare beneficiaries are entitled to receive under the Act.59  The district 
court held that under Goldberg v. Kelly and Wheeler v. Montgomery, an agency 
under the Social Security Act cannot deprive a beneficiary of disability 
benefits without giving the beneficiary “an effective opportunity to defend by 
confronting any adverse witnesses and by presenting his own arguments and 
evidence orally.”60  Although the district court recognized that disability 
beneficiaries are not as dependent on their supplemental benefits as welfare 
recipients or the elderly, the court held that the disability payments did not 
create an “emergency situation” that would permit a lesser due process 
standard.61  The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court and the Supreme 
Court reversed.62 
The Supreme Court in Mathews noted that “‘[D]ue process’ is flexible and 
calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands,” 
which indicates that not all administrative agencies must follow the same 
procedures to comport with requirements of the Fifth Amendment.63  To 
determine whether a plaintiff has been deprived of due process, the Court 
examined three factors: (1) the private interests affected by the administrative 
determination; (2) the risk of wrongful deprivation of those interests by the 
procedures employed by the agency; and (3) the government’s interest, which 
includes any fiscal or administrative burdens that the suggested procedures 
would create.64  In weighing the governmental, or public, interest, the decision 
involves a determination as to when the Constitution imposes adjudicative 
procedures on administrative action to assure fairness.65 
When the Court applied the three-prong test in Mathews, it distinguished a 
disability benefits scenario from the facts present in Goldberg, where due 
process required an oral evidentiary hearing.66  With regard to the private 
interests affected, the Court determined that disability recipients, unlike 
welfare recipients, receive compensation from a potential variety of sources, so 
Eldridge’s deprivation did not rise to the level of that suffered by the affected 
 
 59. See Eldridge v. Weinberger, 361 F. Supp. 520, 521 (W.D. Va. 1973), aff’d 493 F.2d 
1230 (4th Cir. 1984), rev’d sub nom., Mathews, 424 U.S. at 325. 
 60. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 326 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268 (1970); Wheeler 
v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280, 281–82 (1970)). 
 61. Eldridge, 361 F. Supp. at 527–28 (“It is fundamental that except in emergency situations 
(and this is not one) due process requires that when a State seeks to terminate an interest such as 
that here involved, it must afford ‘notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of 
the case’ before the termination becomes effective.” (quoting Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 
(1971))). 
 62. Eldridge, 493 F.2d at 1230 rev’d, Mathews, 424 U.S. at 318. 
 63. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)). 
 64. Id. at 334–35. 
 65. Id. at 348. 
 66. Id. at 349. 
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parties in Goldberg.67  Second, the Court determined that an oral evidentiary 
hearing was less probative for disability beneficiaries, where an administrative 
finding was based substantially on “routine, standard, and unbiased” medical 
records, than in the context of Goldberg welfare recipients, where “issues of 
witness credibility and veracity often are critical to the decisionmaking 
process.”68  In balancing the final concern of the public interest, the Court 
predicted that adding a mandatory evidentiary hearing to a disability benefit 
proceeding would be costly and tedious and would not provide substantial 
additional safeguards to the fairness of the administrative process.69 
Although the Mathews decision entailed a critique of specific procedure in 
the context of a Social Security Act claim, the Mathews three-prong test is 
applied in most cases where a plaintiff raises a due process challenge.70  In 
particular, the test anchors most opinions involving the evidentiary standards 
question in physician disciplinary proceedings.71  Courts are split, however, in 
striking the appropriate balance between the competing interests considered in 
Mathews. 
B. Judicial Advocates of the Preponderance Standard: North Dakota State 
Board of Medical Examiners—Investigative Panel B v. Hsu 
As stated above, the majority of state medical boards use the 
preponderance standard in their proceedings, pursuant to a statute usually 
found in the state’s medical practice act.72  In several of these states, physicians 
have appealed to the state court for judicial review of the standard.  In January 
2007, the North Dakota Supreme Court ruled on such an issue and affirmed the 
state board’s application of preponderance standard.73 
In Hsu, the Court applied the Mathews test and found that a state medical 
board’s use of the preponderance standard comports with due process.74  Dr. 
Hsu was a physician licensed in North Dakota who maintained two 
independent rural health clinics.75  In 2003, the state medical board brought 
 
 67. Id. at 343. 
 68. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343–44.  The Court also determined that the second requirement is 
met in disability benefit actions because the recipient is entitled to view the record prior to the 
cut-off of benefits.  Id.  Also, the beneficiary may submit additional evidence to specifically 
refute any crucial issues the decisionmakers saw in deciding to revoke the recipient’s benefits.  Id.  
This same rationale is not applicable in Goldberg.  Id. 
 69. Id. at 347–48. 
 70. See cases accompanying supra note 51. 
 71. See cases accompanying supra note 51. 
 72. 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, Etc. § 89 (2007). 
 73. N.D. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs—Investigative Panel B v. Hsu, 726 N.W.2d 216, 235 
(N.D. 2007). 
 74. Id. at 232. 
 75. Id. at 219. 
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charges against Dr. Hsu for rendering inappropriate care to seven of his 
patients and failing to maintain proper medical records for those patients.76  An 
administrative law judge recommended a finding of inappropriate care to the 
state medical board and suggested revoking Dr. Hsu’s license unless he agreed 
to subject himself to a system of monitoring and review imposed by the 
board.77  The board decided to temporarily suspended Dr. Hsu’s license.78  
Shortly thereafter, while the board was still determining whether to revoke Dr. 
Hsu’s license, Investigative Panel B of the board issued a second complaint 
against Hsu in 2004, which alleged improper treatment of three other patients 
and inadequate documentation practices.79  After examining the evidence and 
circumstances surrounding the second complaint, the administrative law judge 
renewed his prior recommendation and suggested revocation unless Dr. Hsu 
agreed to monitoring and evaluation by the board.80  The board adopted all but 
one of the administrative law judge’s findings and conclusions and opted to 
revoke Dr. Hsu’s license instead of implementing a monitoring and reviewing 
scheme.81 
Dr. Hsu ultimately appealed the board’s decision to the North Dakota 
Supreme Court, claiming that the board’s use of a preponderance evidentiary 
standard under North Dakota statute section 28-32-46(5) violated his due 
process rights.82  In its review, the court applied the Mathews three-prong test 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id.  Several states give state medical boards the authority to discipline a physician 
without oversight by an administrative law judge, while others require an exhaustion of 
administrative remedies via review by an administrative law judge prior to filing in state court.  
BOVBJERG & ALIAGA, supra note 14, at 27–28. 
 78. Hsu, 726 N.W.2d at 219. 
 79. Id.  In the second complaint, the administrative law judge recommended finding 
improper care for Dr. Hsu’s failure to timely diagnose and treat an acute myocardial infarction, 
who subsequently died as a result.  The administrative law judge, however, recommended no 
finding of inappropriate care for the other two patients because his treatment complied with the 
“patients’ families’ wishes and essentially obtained informed consent from the patients’ families.”  
Id. at 220. 
 80. Id. at 221.  In response to Hsu’s second set of charges, the administrative law judge 
noted: “Dr. Hsu is not a great physician, but neither does that evidence, even when coupled with 
the evidence from this hearing, show that he is a poor physician.  Rather, the evidence shows that 
he is a caring physician, though perhaps a somewhat misguided physician.”  Id. at 220. 
 81. Id. at 221. 
 82. Id.  Hsu originally appealed to the district court, which determined that his due process 
rights were not violated, but remanded the case as a result of the Board’s violation of N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 28-32-39(3).  Id.  The court held that the Board unduly delayed its decision on the 
administrative law judge’s recommendations for Hsu’s 2003 complaint, and therefore the 
recommendations of the administrative law judge became the board’s final order.  Id.  The court 
also held the Board’s rationale for departing from the administrative law judge’s recommendation 
for the 2004 complaint was insufficient and not supported by the record.  Id.  On remand, the 
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and determined that a preponderance standard does not violate the due process 
requirements of the state constitution or United States Constitution.83 
The court applied the first prong of the Mathews test and determined that a 
physician maintains a substantial private interest in his ability to make a living 
in the medical field; however, that interest does not rise to a “fundamental 
right” requiring greater protection by a higher evidentiary standard.84  The 
court’s rationale for the first prong depended greatly on the holding from In re 
Polk, a New Jersey case involving the evidentiary standard issue.85  In Polk, 
the court stated that the right to make a living is not a fundamental right.86  
Though occupational licensure closely resembles a property right, the right is 
“always subject to reasonable regulation in the public interest.”87 
Second, the Hsu court determined that a physician’s private interest is 
properly protected from wrongful deprivation under the preponderance 
standard.88  First, the court followed Polk’s rationale in determining that state 
medical board disciplinary proceedings involve “high substantive standards as 
a basis for discipline and the licensee [can] defend adequately against the 
charges through the protections of the administrative process.”89  Due to the 
adversarial nature of the proceedings, the physician is protected by his ability 
to present evidence and defenses.90  The Hsu court also noted that in state 
medical board proceedings, the factfinders consist primarily of medical 
professionals, thus minimizing the possibility of confusion and 
 
Board clarified its decision to depart from the administrative law judge’s recommendation and 
once again revoke’s Dr. Hsu’s license.  Id. 
 83. Hsu, 726 N.W.2d at 230. 
 84. Id. at 230 (applying the rationale from In re Polk Licensure Revocation, 449 A.2d 7 (N.J. 
1982)).  In Polk, the plaintiff allergist was accused of sexually explicit behavior by several of his 
young female patients.  Polk, 449 A.2d at 10–11.  The lower court also supported its decision to 
apply a clear and convincing evidence standard by citing parallels between physician licensure 
hearings and attorney licensure proceedings, stating it was “unable to perceive any justifiable 
basis for the lawyer to receive the advantage of the more favorable standard of quantum of proof 
in disciplinary proceedings, while denying the benefit of the same standard to the physician 
similarly situated.”  Id.  The New Jersey Supreme Court, however, found this “equal protection” 
argument under the Constitution unpersuasive and stated that “a state is free to ‘deal with the 
different professions according to the needs of the public in relation to each’ and ‘no basis for the 
charge of an unconstitutional discrimination’ is established simply because a regulation affects 
only one profession.”  Id. at 17 (citing Semler v. Or. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 294 U.S. 608, 
610–11 (1935)). 
 85. Hsu, 726 N.W.2d at 229. 
 86. Polk, 449 A.2d at 13–14 (“[I]ndividual interests not rising to the level of fundamental 
right are not entitled to protection by a standard of proof greater than a fair preponderance.”). 
 87. Id. at 13 (quoting Jeselsohn, Inc. v. Atlantic City, 358 A.2d 797, 799 (N.J. 1976)). 
 88. Hsu, 726 N.W.2d at 230. 
 89. Id. at 229 (citing Polk, 449 A.2d at 15–17). 
 90. Id. (citing Petition of Grimm, 635 A.2d 456, 461 (N.H. 1993)). 
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misunderstanding about the substantive matter of the proceeding.91  The court 
concluded that the nature of the proceeding, coupled with the protections of the 
administrative process, sufficiently satisfied a physician’s due process rights 
under a preponderance standard.92 
Finally, after applying the third prong of the Mathews test, the Hsu court 
determined that any interests a physician possesses in licensure are 
overshadowed by the “paramount interest in protecting the general health and 
welfare of the public.”93  According to the court, the special nature of the 
medical profession is such that “incompetence, wrongdoing, or misconduct 
could threaten life itself and protecting citizens was one of the fundamental 
reasons for a government’s existence.”94  Given the serious nature of possible 
wrongdoing by physicians, the court concluded the state’s interest substantially 
outweighs the interests of the physician.95 
Although the court recognized the substantial interest physicians have in 
pursuing a living, the Hsu court ultimately decided that the good of society 
outweighs any harm a physician would incur with license revocation.96  The 
court determined that this societal good is best served with a preponderance 
standard and that due process is sufficiently granted to physicians with a lower 
standard, which follows the rationale of several other state courts that advocate 
the preponderance standard.97 
C. Judicial Advocates of the Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard: 
Nguyen v. State, Dept. of Health Med. Quality Assurance Comm’n 
Just as several state judges fervently advocate a preponderance standard, 
other state judges firmly advocate a clear and convincing evidence standard.98  
Nguyen v. State, Department of Health Medical Quality Assurance 
Commission is a recent example of how courts applying the Matthews test may 
come to very different conclusions regarding the due process implications of 
the preponderance standard. 
 
 91. Id. at 230.  See also Grimm, 635 A.2d at 461. 
 92. Hsu, 726 N.W.2d at 230. 
 93. Id. at 229 (quoting Polk, 449 A.2d at 14). 
 94. Id. at 230 (citing Gandhi v. Med. Examining Bd., 483 N.W.2d, 295, 299 (Wisc. Ct. App. 
1992)). 
 95. Id. (“We are mindful a physician’s interest in a medical license is a property interest and 
is not insubstantial.  In our view, however, the State’s interest in protecting the health, safety, and 
welfare of its citizens is superior to a licensee’s interest.”) 
 96. Id. 
 97. Hsu, 726 N.W.2d at 229–230. 
 98. See, e.g., Nguyen v. State, Dept. of Med. Quality Assurance Comm’n, 29 P.3d 689, 689 
(Wash. 2001) (en banc); Johnson v. Bd. of Gov. of Reg. Dentists, 913 P.2d 1339, 1342 (Okla. 
1996); Painter v. Abels, 998 P.2d 931, 940–41 (Wyo. 2000). 
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Dr. Nguyen was a medical doctor licensed to practice in Washington 
state.99  In 1989, the state medical board suspended Dr. Nguyen’s license after 
determining “his practice had fallen below acceptable professional 
standards.”100  The suspension was stayed on the condition that Nguyen be 
monitored by another doctor.  Dr. Nguyen complied with this requirement and 
in 1991, the monitoring physician recommended that monitoring be reduced.101  
Monitoring continued until the state board brought a new set of charges against 
Dr. Nguyen in 1996.102  The new charges alleged Dr. Nguyen rendered 
unprofessional care in the treatment of twenty-two patients and that Dr. 
Nguyen had engaged in sexual misconduct with three of his patients.103  The 
state medical board summarily suspended Dr. Nguyen’s license pending a 
formal hearing on the merits of the allegations.104  After a six-day hearing in 
which counsel represented Dr. Nguyen, the state medical board found by a 
preponderance of the evidence that Dr. Nguyen had engaged in sexual 
misconduct with three of his patients.105  As a result, the board revoked Dr. 
Nguyen’s medical license and forbid him to seek re-licensure for five years.106 
Dr. Nguyen appealed the decision in state court, claiming that his 
constitutional due process rights had been violated when the board applied a 
preponderance standard.107  The Nguyen court applied the Mathews test and 
determined that due process requires state medical boards to use a clear and 
convincing evidentiary standard.108 
In determining the private interests of the physician, the first prong of the 
Mathews test, the Nguyen court considered more than just the physician’s 
interest in pursuing a living.109  In civil proceedings, the interest of the 
physician is exclusively proprietary.  Although the physician has an interest in 
keeping his money, he does not risk losing the ability to earn money 
altogether.110  By contrast, in disciplinary proceedings conducted by state 
 
 99. Nguyen, 29 P.3d at 689. 
 100. Id. at 689–90. 
 101. Id. at 690. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Nguyen, 29 P.3d at 690. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id.  Nguyen also claimed that use of the preponderance standard violated the Equal 
Protection Clause because attorney disciplinary proceedings, in contrast, used a clear and 
convincing evidentiary standard.  Id.  The court, determining that due process required a clear and 
convincing evidentiary standard, declined to decide the equal protection issue.  Id. at 697. 
 108. Id. at 693–97. 
 109. Nguyen, 29 P.3d at 694. 
 110. Id. 
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medical boards, the court claimed that doctors have a liberty interest in the 
preservation of their professional reputations as well.111  The court remarked: 
“Loss or suspension of the physician’s license destroys his or her ability to 
practice medicine, diminishes the doctor’s standing in both the medical and lay 
communities, and deprives the doctor of the benefit of a degree for which he or 
she has spent tens (if not hundreds) of thousands of dollars pursuing.”112 
Unlike civil proceedings, disciplinary proceedings are “quasi-criminal”; any 
adverse consequences of a proceeding are punitive in nature.113  Applying this 
rationale from Addington v. Texas, the Nguyen court held that these special 
interest considerations afford a doctors a fundamental interest in their 
profession.114 
In applying the second prong of the Mathews test, the Nguyen court 
contradicted the rationale used by preponderance courts.  The Nguyen court 
was also not convinced that procedural safeguards under a preponderance 
standard were sufficient.115  The court believed the mechanisms of the 
proceeding, such as the right to an attorney, the right to judicial review and 
even the right to a hearing are all irrelevant to the issue of reducing the chance 
of error.116  Regarding fairness, the court held that a risk of error is already 
high because (1) the agency is permitted to act as investigator, prosecutor and 
decisionmaker; (2) the subjective nature of determining standards of conduct, 
which usually depend on opinion more than set rules; and (3) a lower burden 
of proof increases the chances that a physician may be deprived of a license 
based on an isolated instance.117 
Finally, the Nguyen court examined the public interest under the Mathews 
test.  In contrast with cases like Hsu, the court did not believe a clear and 
convincing evidence standard would cause greater harm to the public.  The 
Nguyen court explained that although public protection is important, “the 
government’s interests are only furthered by medical disciplinary proceedings 
which reach an accurate and reliable result.”118  The court determined that in 
actuality, the public’s interest would be better served by a clear and convincing 
 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. (citing In re Revocation of License of Kindschi, 319 P.2d 824 (1958)). 
 114. Nguyen, 29 P.3d at 694 (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979)).  
Addington requires proceedings that are “quasi-criminal” in nature to use a clear and convincing 
evidence standard.  The rationale in Addington has been used to describe licensure revocation 
procedure for attorneys as well as physicians.  See, e.g., Golden v. State Bar of Cal., 2 P.2d 325, 
329 (1931). 
 115. Nguyen, 29 P.3d at 695. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 695–96. 
 118. Id. at 696–97. 
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evidence standard because it would result in fewer erroneous license 
revocations.119 
IV.  A NEW SOLUTION: THE FLORIDA “THREE STRIKES RULE” 
Although many states have taken sides in the debate by choosing one 
standard over the other, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to settle the 
issue.120  Florida, on the other hand, has taken a different approach in an 
attempt to reconcile the competing interests of the issue.  In a bold and 
controversial move, Floridians passed Amendment 8 (“the Amendment”) to 
their state constitution in 2004, which created a Three Strikes Rule that revokes 
the licenses of physicians found to have committed three instances of medical 
malpractice.121 
A. The Citizens’ Initiative: Amendment 8 
Preceding Florida’s 2004 election, the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers 
backed a citizens’ initiative to support, among other things, two proposed 
amendments to the Florida constitution.122  The Amendment, now known as 
the Three Strikes Rule, stated: “No person who has been found to have 
committed three or more incidents of medical malpractice shall be licensed or 
continue to be licensed by the State of Florida to provide health care services 
as a doctor.”123  The Amendment would affect all doctors practicing in Florida 
and would take all medical malpractice judgments into account, regardless of 
whether the malpractice suit had been decided in or out of state.124  Floridians 
for Patient Protection (“FPP”) sponsored the Amendment and raised almost 
 
 119. Id. at 697. 
 120. See Wash. State Med. Quality Assurance Comm’n v. Nguyen, 29 P.3d 689, cert. denied, 
535 U.S. 904 (2002). 
 121. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 26. 
 122. Mark D. Killian, Academy, FMA Square Off Over Amendments, 31 FL. BAR NEWS 13 
(2004).  The other proposed amendment advocated by the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers, 
“Amendment 7,” promoted citizen access to peer review documents and adverse incident reports 
of physicians as well as fixed rates for physician services to all patients.  Id. 
 123. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 26.  The “Three Strikes” Amendment was one of three citizen’s 
initiatives on the ballot for that election.  Killian, supra note 122, at 13.  “Amendment 3,” backed 
by the Florida Medical Association, essentially decreased the percentage of attorney’s fees for 
damages awarded to successful medical malpractice litigants.  Id.   “Amendment 7,” the other 
proposed amendment advocated by the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers, would allow citizen 
access to peer review documents and adverse incident reports of physicians.  Id. 
 124. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 26.  The amendment defines medical malpractice as: 
both the failure to practice medicine in Florida with that level of care, skill, and treatment 
recognized in general law related to health care providers’ licensure, and any similar 
wrongful act, neglect, or default in other states or countries which, if committed in 
Florida, would have been considered medical malpractice. 
Id. 
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$12 million by April 2004 in support of the initiative.125  The ballot title for the 
Amendment read “Public Protection from Repeated Medical Malpractice.”126 
Prior to the passage of the Amendment, the Department of Health had 
discretion in the discipline of physicians for “gross or repeated malpractice.”127  
The Department maintained the authority to revoke medical licenses of 
physicians who consistently and repeatedly committed malpractice, but FPP 
argued that the Department had been too lenient in exercising its authority.128  
In a 2002 national state survey, Florida ranked forty-fourth in the number of 
serious disciplinary actions taken against physicians.  Florida’s low score 
raised “serious questions about the extent to which patients . . . [were] being 
protected from physicians who might well be barred from practice in states 
with boards that [were] doing a better job of disciplining physicians.”129  
Ironically, a Public Citizen survey revealed “6 percent of the doctors in Florida 
[were] responsible for half the malpractice.”130  The initiative was targeted at 
these incompetent physicians who were allegedly responsible for high 
industry-wide premiums.131 
The Amendment was met with both fear and criticism from the medical 
profession.132  Several doctors thought the Three Strikes Rule, which happened 
to be heavily supported by attorneys, was aimed at forcing doctors to settle 
cases.133  The medical community feared a mass exodus of physicians from 
Florida, particularly in the high-risk areas of obstetrics, neurosurgery, 
orthopedic surgery and trauma care.134  The Florida Dental Association 
believed the Amendment raised due process concerns because the rule would 
lower the evidentiary standard in malpractice suits from clear and convincing 
evidence to a mere preponderance standard.135  Doctors also expressed concern 
 
 125. OFFICE OF ECON. & DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH, THE FLORIDA LEGISLATURE, 
INITIATIVE FINANCIAL INFORMATION STATEMENT: PUBLIC PROTECTION FROM REPEATED 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (2004), available at http://edr.state.fl.us/conferences/constitutional 
impact/2004%20Ballot/a4fis_complete.pdf. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. PUBLIC CITIZEN, RANKING OF STATE MEDICAL BOARD SERIOUS DISCIPLINARY 
ACTIONS IN 2002 (2002), available at http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7234. 
 130. Siobhan Morrissey, Doctors Fear Three-Strikes Law: Florida Amendment Could Make 
Med-Mal Settlements a Law Practice Niche, 45 A.B.A. J. E-REPORT 3 (2004). 
 131. Steve Ellman, Capped, Exposed and Ejected: Plaintiff Lawyers and Doctors Warn of 
Dire Consequences in Battle Over Nov. 2 Ballot Initiatives to Limit Attorney Fees, Open Medical 
Error Records, and Revoke Repeat Offenders’ Licenses, PALM BEACH DAILY BUS. REV., Oct. 11, 
2004, at 7. 
 132. Id. at 7–8. 
 133. Id. at 8. 
 134. Siobhan Morrissey, Med-Mal War Hits the Ballot, 30 A.B.A. J. E-REPORT 1, 2 (2004). 
 135. Ellman, supra note 131, at 8. 
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over retroactive application: Would doctors who already had two malpractice 
judgments against them have to settle future cases out of fear of losing their 
licenses?136 
To resolve some of these issues, the Florida Attorney General requested an 
advisory opinion from the Florida Supreme Court regarding the Amendment’s 
constitutionality under Florida law.137  The court determined (1) whether the 
Amendment satisfied the single-subject requirement under Florida’s 
constitution;138 and (2) whether the ballot title and summary satisfied the 
requirements imposed by Florida law.139  The Florida Medical Association 
argued the Amendment violated the single-subject requirement because it 
would substantially alter or perform “the functions of multiple aspects of 
government.”140  The court rejected this argument and found that the 
Amendment did not affect the legislative or judicial branch in “precipitous” or 
“cataclysmic” ways that would justify striking the proposal.141  The court also 
rejected that the Amendment would require license revocation on the basis of a 
preponderance standard instead of the clear and convincing evidence standard 
applied by the state medical board, which would force the judiciary to either 
overrule established law or change the standard of proof in malpractice 
cases.142  The court stated that this speculation was premature, despite potential 
for the Amendment’s “broad ramifications.”143  Next, the Florida Medical 
Association argued the Amendment’s language violated Florida law because it 
was misleading and ambiguous in lacking clear definitions for terms like 
“medical malpractice” and “found to have committed.”144  The court also 
rejected these arguments and held that Florida law did not require “‘an 
 
 136. Id. 
 137. In re Advisory Opinion to Att’y Gen. re Pub. Prot. from Repeated Malpractice, 880 So. 
2d 667, 668 (Fla. 2004). 
 138. See FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3 (“The power to propose the revision or amendment of any 
portion or portions of this constitution by initiative is reserved to the people, provided that any 
such revision or amendment . . . shall embrace but one subject and matter directly connected 
therewith.”) 
 139. In re Advisory Opinion to Att’y Gen. re Pub. Prot. from Repeated Malpractice, 880 
So.2d at 669–73.  See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.161 (2007) (“Whenever a constitutional 
amendment or other public measure is submitted to the vote of the people, the substance of such 
amendment or other public measure shall be printed in clear and unambiguous language.”). 
 140. In re Advisory Opinion to Att’y Gen. re Pub. Prot. from Repeated Malpractice, 880 
So.2d at 669. 
 141. Id. at 670 (citing In re Advisory Opinion to Att’y Gen. re Requirement for Adequate 
Pub. Educ. Funding, 703 So.2d 446, 450 (Fla. 1997)). 
 142. Id. at 670–71. 
 143. Id. at 671 (quoting In re Advisory Opinion to Att’y Gen.—English—The Official 
Language of Florida, 520 So.2d 11, 13 (Fla. 1988)). 
 144. Id. at 671–73. 
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exhaustive explanation of the interpretation and future possible effects of the 
amendment’ . . . in the ballot title and summary.”145 
Despite the controversy, the Florida Supreme Court approved the language 
of the proposed amendment, and the ballot was put to a vote in the November 
election.146  On November 2, 2004, the Amendment passed by a substantial 
margin.147 
B. Clarifications to Amendment 8 Integrate a Clear and Convincing 
Evidence Standard 
On November 4, 2004, physicians were already discussing challenges to 
the Amendment, which was then part of the Florida constitution.148  Attorneys 
for physicians argued that the Amendment was unconstitutional “because it 
pressure[d] doctors to surrender their due process guarantee to trial by jury” by 
not counting pre-trial settlements toward a doctor’s three strikes.149  Another 
concern arose from the Amendment’s application to out-of-state judgments 
where standards of proof may differ.150  As a result of several concerns over 
the implementation of the Amendment, the Florida Hospital Association 
convinced the circuit court to stay the enforcement of the Amendment for a 
year in order to allow legislators to draft enabling legislation.151 
In late April 2005, the State House passed two bills explaining how the 
Amendment would be put into effect.  First, the legislation provided that only 
incidents occurring on or after November 2, 2004, would count toward a 
physician’s three strikes.152  Similarly, multiple findings of malpractice arising 
from the same incident and incidents involving multiple claimants would count 
only as a single strike.153  For the purposes of the Amendment, strikes would 
not include settlements—only final judgments in a court of law, final 
administrative agency decisions or decisions of binding arbitration would 
 
 145. Id. at 673 (citing Advisory Opinion to Att’y Gen. re Amendment to Bar Gov’t from 
Treating People Differently Based on Race in Pub. Educ., 778 So.2d 888, 899 (Fla. 2000)). 
 146. Id. at 670. 
 147. Steve Ellman, Lawyers’ Challenges Already in the Works, MIAMI DAILY BUS. REV., 
Nov. 4, 2004, at 1–2 (stating that Amendment 8 passed with the support of more than 70% of 
Florida voters). 
 148. Id. at 2. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Steve Ellman, Ignoring the Voters: Interest Groups Battle in Court to Block 
Constitutional Amendments Approved by Floridians Last Month, MIAMI DAILY BUS. REV., Dec. 
20, 2004, at 10. 
 152. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 456.50(1)(h) (2007). 
 153. § 456.50(1)(d). 
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count.154  One clarification, however, would help to alleviate physician 
concerns over a “surge of malpractice claims.”155 
In its enabling legislation, Florida lawmakers decided to safeguard the 
procedural due process rights of physicians by applying a strict evidentiary 
standard to malpractice claims against them.  According to current Florida law, 
for the purposes of implementing the Three Strikes Rule, the state medical 
board “shall not license or continue to license a medical doctor found to have 
committed repeated malpractice, the finding of which was based upon clear 
and convincing evidence.”156  Under this addition, if the state medical board 
determines that a malpractice action was decided under “a standard less 
stringent than clear and convincing evidence, the board shall review the record 
of the case and determine whether the finding would be supported under a 
standard of clear and convincing evidence.”157 The evidentiary standard 
provides the board with the ability to block a licensure revocation if the board 
thinks the evidence would be insufficient under the higher standard.  In passing 
this legislation, Florida created a regime that protected the public while 
simultaneously cushioning the due process rights of physicians. 
V.  ANALYSIS: INTEGRATING POLICY CONCERNS 
The policy concerns behind the evidentiary standards debate are similar to 
those in many constitutional debates: protection of the individual versus the 
protection of the public.158  Arguably, current schemes that grant state medical 
boards sole discretion in licensure revocations have not effectively reduced the 
number of incompetent doctors.159  This raises serious concerns regarding the 
adequacy of public protection by failing to address the interests of medical 
malpractice victims.  Alternatively, physicians under a preponderance standard 
regime feel that their due process rights are not properly protected.160  The 
Florida Three Strikes Rule provides an alternative scheme that balances the 
competing concerns of the Mathews three-prong test.  This regime potentially 
removes more faulty physicians who pose a threat to the public, while the 
incorporation of a clear and convincing evidence standard ensures that the due 
process rights of physicians are protected.  This will likely lead to not only a 
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greater number of license revocations, but also a greater number of correct 
license revocations.161 
A. The Three Strikes Rule Extends Greater Protection to the Public than 
Current State Medical Board Regimes 
One of the reasons the Amendment was enacted was to provide a 
mechanism for disciplining doctors with a history of bad medical judgment.162  
Studies show that multiple malpractice judgments are strong indications of 
doctors who consistently fall below proper standards of care.163  A scheme that 
automatically revokes a physician’s license deprives the board of its deferential 
discretion in situations where peer review has protected incompetent 
physicians. 
Although physicians are arguably some of the most trained and careful 
professionals in American society, the rate of error still remains high.164  A 
1990 Harvard study of physicians determined that from a group of 7,743 
medical records, 280 revealed adverse events that occurred as a result of 
negligence.165  Negligence was associated with fifty-one percent of all deaths 
from medical injury.166  In a more recent study, medical error was found to be 
the “fifth-leading cause of deaths in the United States,” causing as many as 
98,000 deaths every year.167  Unfortunately, when physicians deviate from the 
proper standard of care, the potential effects may result in serious harm to their 
patients.  Physicians are among the few professionals who have a direct impact 
on nearly every individual in society.  As a result, the government creates vast 
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regulatory schemes, primarily through the police power given to the states, to 
ensure that the public health is properly protected against those who are ill-
qualified to practice medicine.168  Unfortunately, error is still a common 
occurrence within the medical community. 
A report by the Public Citizen indicates that while malpractice payments 
remain high, the number of physicians who have malpractice judgments 
against them remains low.169  Since 1990, only eighteen percent of doctors 
have paid out a medical malpractice award.170  This figure reveals that the 
majority of medical malpractice is committed by a small percentage of 
doctors.171  Unfortunately, peer review often fails to protect the public from 
this small faction of repeat offenders.  Of the doctors who have made ten or 
more malpractice payments since 1990, only thirty-three percent had action 
taken against them by the state medical board.172  This percentage includes any 
kind of disciplinary action, not just licensure revocations.  One physician “had 
at least thirty-one malpractice payments between 1993 and 2005,”—three 
payments alone because the doctor retained a foreign object in a patient’s body 
after surgery.173  Another surgeon paid out malpractice payments at least 
eighteen times; twelve of those payments resulted from “improper performance 
of surgery.”174  These statistics indicate that the problem of protecting the 
public does not stem from evidentiary standards, but rather the failure to 
prosecute incompetent doctors despite glaring red flags that the doctor is 
consistently negligent in his practice of medicine. 
William P. Gunnar explains several reasons why state licensing boards are 
inefficient monitors of physician misbehavior and incompetence.175  First, the 
decision of a state medical licensing board to suspend or revoke a license is 
subject to judicial review, which decreases the finality of decisions.176  Second, 
due to limited budgets and insufficiency of staff, boards have trouble 
defending lawsuits when physicians contest a board’s decision in court.177  
Added costs are associated with investigations and hearings conducted by the 
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board itself.178  Third, physicians may be lenient when judging a peer.179  
Fourth, there may be lengthy processing delays when a board attempts to 
discipline the physician.180  Fifth, due process requires more than 
circumstantial evidence.181  Finally, courts generally limit their support of 
disciplinary actions by state boards only in regard to actions involving 
“regulated narcotics, abortions, and physician-assisted suicide.”182  The Florida 
statute theoretically eradicates many of these problems faced by state medical 
boards that use either a preponderance or clear and convincing evidence 
standard.  This is largely because the Three Strikes Rule provides an automatic 
mechanism for disciplining physicians as opposed to relying on the discretion 
of the board to prosecute claims. 
Most times, disciplinary committees depend on complaints from patients 
or patients’ families to begin an investigation.183  Several boards can conduct 
an investigation without a formal public complaint, but they may lack the 
budget to provide information and tracking systems necessary to spot 
problematic physicians.184  While repeated malpractice payments are clear 
indications of incompetent physicians, the board may lack the fiscal capability 
or the integrity to conduct an investigation, evaluate the evidence, conduct a 
hearing and impose sanctions.185  For instance, the median state medical board 
spends forty-nine percent of its budget on investigative functions alone.186  
Implementing a structure that automatically revokes a physician’s license 
would greatly reduce the fiscal restraints on boards by removing several of the 
costly steps in physician discipline.  The investigative costs are substantially 
diminished because the private parties in past litigation have already assumed 
the burden by creating a record in the course of the dispute.  The records from 
the formal adjudications create a preserved evidentiary record the board may 
use in determining whether the license revocation is appropriate.187  Although 
the Florida legislature determined that requests for administrative hearings and 
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binding arbitration hearings would increase, the cost of these proceedings 
would be minimal compared to the state board’s overall budget.188 
The public is also protected because the amendment removes the potential 
leniency of peer review.  Scholars have criticized medical board for their high 
composition of other physicians; this may result in a veil of silence and a 
reluctance to revoke licensure due to the bonds of sharing a difficult 
profession.189  The Three Strikes Rule substantially diminishes a board’s 
ability to protect their own in situations where a clearly incompetent doctor 
should not be permitted to retain a license.  Once a doctor has three 
malpractice judgments against him or her, the board cannot turn a blind eye 
and shield the doctor from the consequences of his or her actions without 
violating the law itself.190  Under the Three Strikes Rule, the board no longer 
examines the merits of the action, but may only evaluate whether the evidence 
is sufficient in all three cases to support revocation under the statute.191 
Although little investigation has been conducted since the Amendment’s 
passage, the Amendment should logically result in a greater number of 
disciplinary actions before the board.  In this way, a large part of the problem 
created by peer review boards is rectified because the board may no longer 
pick and choose all actions that come before it for review.  The Amendment 
taps into a pool of doctors who, by virtue of their malpractice claims, should 
arguably be examined for their competency, and the law enables boards to 
examine these doctors without the costs of investigations or hearings. 
B. Weighing the Private Interest of Physicians 
It may be obvious that the public interest is better protected by the Three 
Strikes Rule in that it diminishes the discretion of medical boards in revoking 
physician licenses.  After all, the Amendment itself was passed by a citizens’ 
initiative.192  The arguments presented by the physicians in Hsu and Nguyen, 
however, should not be taken lightly.  Arguably, physicians invest more time 
and money into pursuing their careers than almost any other professionals in 
America. 
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As of October 2001, the average medical student incurred $99,089 of debt 
from attending medical school alone.193  In addition, physicians invest 
countless hours in pursuit of a medical degree and devote over eighty hours per 
week to work during their residencies and practice.194 The high price of 
malpractice insurance has caused several doctors to leave the profession in 
high-risk areas like obstetrics.195 
Unlike civil actions, which involve the payment of money to the injured 
party, licensure revocation involves the deprivation of a doctor’s ability to 
pursue his livelihood. The monetary penalty is significant for doctors, 
especially compared to other professions.196  Similar to a criminal conviction, 
professional discipline also “invariably blights a professional’s reputation and 
can destroy one’s career and life.”197  Disciplinary actions tend to share similar 
goals with penal convictions: deterrence, rehabilitation, incapacitation of 
liberty or behavior, or retribution.198  As such, it is important to be mindful of 
the interests held in a life’s work, and deprivation of a career can be far more 
devastating than the simple payment of money. 
The Nguyen court emphasizes the difference between payment of a civil 
money damage and the revocation of a medical license.199  In its opinion, the 
Nguyen court explained several situations that rise above the level of a civil 
money judgment, which include “quasi-criminal wrongdoings by the 
defendant” and proceedings that incur the risk of having one’s “reputation 
tarnished erroneously.”200  For these reasons, the public interest should not be 
weighed at the complete expense of the physician’s interest.  In a three strikes 
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regime, however, the desirability of public protection has a tendency to stifle 
the individual rights of citizens without providing proper safeguards.  This is 
why a clear and convincing evidence standard is an essential feature to the 
fairness and constitutionality of the Three Strikes Rule. 
C. The Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard Applied in the Three Strikes 
Rule Alleviates the Risk of Wrongful Deprivation 
Although the Three Strikes Rule creates a blanket of public protection not 
originally afforded to victims of malpractice, it is highly likely that 
enforcement under a preponderance standard would be a clear violation of due 
process for several reasons. 
Under the Mathews test, an administrative proceeding violates due process 
if it creates a substantial risk that an individual will be wrongfully deprived of 
a private interest.201  Some have argued that under the traditional regime, a 
state board that conducts a formal hearing using a preponderance standard 
instead of a clear and convincing evidence standard already violates 
constitutional due process requirements.202 As previously stated, the 
investigators for state medical boards are often members of the medical 
profession itself and take part in the investigatory, prosecutorial and 
administrative functions of the disciplinary process.203  This “blending of 
functions” does not in itself violate procedural due process; however, some 
courts have observed that this scenario increases the risk that a physician’s 
rights will be erroneously violated under a preponderance standard.204  
Similarly, advocates for the clear and convincing evidence standard argue that 
boards that are pressured by the government and the media to be harder on 
physicians are more likely to erroneously deprive them of their licenses under 
the preponderance standard.205 
Advocates of a preponderance standard argue that a lower standard would 
result in more licensure revocations, and as a result, the public interest would 
be greater protected against incompetent physicians.206  While there is very 
little evidence with regard to the disciplinary outcomes of using either 
standard, it is probable that in egregious instances of malpractice, a doctor who 
is disciplined under a preponderance standard would also be disciplined under 
a clear and convincing evidence standard.  For example, Wyoming uses a clear 
and convincing evidentiary standard in licensure proceedings and was ranked 
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first in the country in 2002 for the percentage of serious disciplinary actions 
taken against doctors.207  North Dakota, which uses a preponderance standard, 
was ranked second that year, showing that evidentiary standards might have 
little influence on whether or not an incompetent doctor will be disciplined.208  
Theoretically, a small contingent of doctors would escape liability under a 
clear and convincing evidence standard.  In this situation, however, Roy G. 
Spece argues that advocates of a preponderance standard “reflect a willingness 
to destroy individual physicians’ lives, careers, and reputations even when 
there is a forty-nine percent chance that the charges are false,” and it is far 
more favorable to err on the side of caution to protect the private interests of 
the physician.209 
The U.S. Supreme Court has refused to decide whether a preponderance 
standard in a formal medical board hearing constitutes a violation of due 
process.210  While there are strong arguments indicating that erroneous 
deprivation of a physician’s rights is increased by use of a preponderance 
standard, this risk would increase exponentially under a three strikes regime.  
According to current Florida law, civil malpractice actions use a 
preponderance of the evidence standard, which is commonly used in most 
states.211  If a state were to use that same preponderance standard under a three 
strikes regime, it would eliminate any need for review of the doctor’s record 
prior to revoking his license because the evidentiary standards for both 
proceedings would be identical.  Under the Mathews test, this situation would 
not only increase the likelihood that a review proceeding would cause 
erroneous deprivation, but it also could potentially eliminate the need for any 
review proceeding at all.  Essentially, if a doctor committed three instances of 
malpractice, all of the proceedings would necessarily meet a preponderance of 
the evidence standard under Florida malpractice law, collapsing the review 
process for state medical boards.  Therefore, if a state’s Three Strikes Rule 
used a preponderance standard, theoretically, no added safeguard or review 
procedure would be necessary to revoke the physician’s license. 
This situation is problematic for two reasons.  First, the Florida Three 
Strikes Rule is a mechanism that not only deprives medical boards of 
discretion in whether to conduct an investigation, but also of some of the 
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decisionmaking power with regard to revocation.212  This is one reason the 
Three Strikes Rule was so unpopular with physicians to begin with—it 
deprives doctors of a hearing on the merits when they were previously afforded 
one under traditional licensure laws.213  By depriving doctors of any review 
procedure whatsoever, it further deprives the board of any discretion to prevent 
license revocation where it is unjust or inappropriate.  Second, the private 
interests at stake in civil trials are completely different than those at stake in 
licensure proceedings.  In a civil trial, the dispute occurs between two private 
parties and the consequences are usually monetary.  Liability in a malpractice 
suit generally entails a payment of damages.  Unlike a private suit, doctors 
must defend their ability to practice their chosen careers in revocation 
proceedings.  If a doctor has his license taken away, it deprives him not only of 
personal funds, but also of the ability to practice medicine and make a 
livelihood altogether.  Therefore, under the Mathews framework, the law must 
leave some procedural safeguards to ensure that a physician is not unfairly 
deprived of his livelihood. 
Under the current Florida Three Strikes Rule, a clear and convincing 
evidence standard alleviates the due process concerns discussed in Nguyen and 
other cases while still furthering the public interest.214  According to the 
Florida constitution, a doctor’s license is not automatically revoked unless he 
committed three instances of malpractice based on clear and convincing 
evidence.215  Since the evidentiary standard for malpractice actions in Florida 
is a preponderance standard, the state medical board must review the doctor’s 
record to see if the malpractice findings would have been supported by clear 
and convincing evidence.216  By enforcing a clear and convincing evidence 
standard, the statute creates a review procedure that is more mindful of due 
process than a statute utilizing a preponderance standard.  The Amendment 
requires the state medical board to reexamine the doctor’s record to assess 
whether his behavior is worthy of revocation, thus providing a procedure that 
protects the physician’s individual interests.217 
While the clear and convincing evidentiary standard is ideal for several 
reasons, it could pose a potential problem in practice—the possibility of 
essentially retrying cases.  The actual procedures under the law have yet to be 
determined; however, it appears the board would not have to retry each case in 
the sense of a formal hearing.  The law states that if a potential strike, or 
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malpractice case, was determined based on a standard lower than clear and 
convincing evidence, “the board shall review the record of the case and 
determine whether the finding would be supported under a standard of clear 
and convincing evidence.”218  The procedures for a normal revocation hearing 
would then apply, which include, but are not limited to: (1) an investigation; 
(2) a hearing based on the finding of probable cause; (3) a formal hearing 
before an administrative law judge if there are any “disputed issues of material 
fact,” not including those determinations regarding reasonable standard of care 
or laws and regulation of the profession; and (4) standing to seek judicial 
review of any final order of the board.219  It appears that the first two 
requirements would not be necessary as long as a court deemed the malpractice 
case records sufficient for the investigation and probable cause requirements.  
It may be more difficult to determine whether the board’s determinations based 
on clear and convincing evidence would create “disputed issues of material 
fact” sufficient to justify an administrative hearing.  This situation would 
clearly take some of the mechanization and efficiency out of a Three Strikes 
Rule; however, the doctor would still be precluded from disputing 
determinations of the board based on the standard of care issue in an 
administrative hearing.220  Thus, even assuming the professional would be 
allowed to seek judicial review of the board’s determination, a three strikes 
regime should still remove some of the costly and time-consuming steps of a 
current system—even with a clear and convincing evidence standard. 
A clear and convincing evidence standard certainly loosens the firm grip of 
a Three Strikes Rule on repeat medical malpractice offenders.  This loosening 
potentially circumvents some of the intent of the original law.  However, it still 
significantly addresses the concerns behind the citizens’ initiative.  For 
instance, some critics might argue that by placing a discretionary mechanism 
on the automatic revocation scheme, the board could use the clear and 
convincing evidence provision to avoid revocation and thus evade the 
Amendment’s purpose.221  Although this is a possibility, the current scheme 
still firmly focuses on one of the bigger problems with a traditional licensing 
board scenario—insufficient prosecution.  According to a government study of 
six state medical boards, only one and a half percent of all complaints 
regarding physician discipline make it to the formal hearing stage as a result of 
budgetary restraints, insufficient evidence or other competing concerns.222  The 
results are not much better regarding discipline of repeat offenders.  According 
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to the Public Citizen, “only [thirty-three] percent of doctors who made 10 or 
more malpractice payments were disciplined by their state board.”223  
Arguably, these are the problems the citizens’ initiative sought to address, and 
under the current scheme, some cases that would not have originally come 
before the review board must now be examined.  The board is no longer given 
the choice of ignoring a doctor who has committed ten instances of 
malpractice—the doctor must undergo examination.224  The only way the 
doctor or the board may avoid license revocation is if the evidence in the case 
does not meet a clear and convincing standard.225 
Further, the Three Strikes Rule does not prevent the board from 
prosecuting complaints under the traditional scheme and instituting other 
penalties as it normally would.226  When the Florida Three Strikes Rule was 
added to the state constitution and later modified to include the clear and 
convincing evidence standard, it did not remove the existing medical board 
procedures for physician discipline.227  Instead, the Amendment merely added 
an additional safeguard to ensure that repeat offenders of malpractice did not 
slip through the cracks of licensure discipline.  Nothing prevents the board 
under the current scheme from investigating, prosecuting and disciplining 
physicians as a result of a complaint, even for one instance of medical 
malpractice.228  The Three Strikes Rule does not lessen the obligations of the 
board to revoke the licenses of incompetent physicians.  Rather, the clear and 
convincing evidence standard simply requires the board to discipline with a 
higher degree of certainty in a situation where a legal mechanism automatically 
takes the doctor’s license without a right to a formal hearing. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In light of the current medical malpractice dilemma, the need for fair and 
uniform standards is more important than ever.  On the one hand, patients who 
have suffered at the hands of incompetent doctors deserve not only 
compensation, but also protection and peace of mind that harmful physicians 
are no longer permitted to practice.  On the other hand, physicians who invest 
time, money and hard work into their professional practice deserve a fair and 
meaningful procedure that provides protection for their constitutional rights.  
Uniform standards provide predictability for litigants and stability in the law.  
Unfortunately, when state courts are faced with determining the correct 
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evidentiary standard for state medical boards, the attempt to resolve competing 
interests creates dissonance in the law and makes fairness impossible under 
current regimes.  Courts that balance these competing interests are forced to tip 
the scale in one direction or the other, creating a situation where one side must 
strike out. 
A three strikes regime creates a reliable, uniform and cost-effective method 
for taking on repeat medical malpractice offenders.  By automatically 
removing incompetent physicians from the public, the scheme alleviates the 
costs of investigation and the potential leniency of state medical boards, thus 
protecting the public interest.  By widening the playing field, however, the 
scheme creates the likelihood that doctors will be erroneously deprived of their 
right to practice medicine.  This is why a clear and convincing evidentiary 
standard is necessary in the context of a three strikes amendment.  Ideally, the 
scheme will weed out bad doctors while ensuring fairness of procedure, which 
will create a better balance between two irreconcilable interests.  By tightening 
the “strike zone” of physician licensure revocations with a clear and 
convincing evidentiary standard, doctors can get a fair chance at the plate 
before striking out, and innocent patients can play a game they finally have a 
chance to win. 
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